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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."' Although
the Constitution provides for the protection of free speech, this right is not
unfettered. The courts have placed limitations on free speech in areas in which
the freedom of speech of one individual significantly encroaches upon the rights
of another individual. For example, the Court has limited freedom of speech in
cases involving obscenity2 and fighting words. 3 These cases demonstrate the
willingness of the Supreme Court to grant different levels and types of
protection to different categories of commuication.
Defamation is another area in which freedom of speech has encountered
limitations. The law of defamation is aimed at protecting the plaintiff's
reputation. 4.In defamation cases, courts face the tension between a speaker's
freedom of speech and the reputational interests of a plaintiff. As in obscenity
I U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Supreme Court presented a three-
pronged test to determine whether obscene speech deserved Constitutional protection. This
test probed whether: (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. Id. This test illustrates the Court's willingness to grant less
protection to speech that meets this test for obscenity.
3 The origin of the fighting words doctrine is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court defined fighting words as "those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace." Id. at
572. The Court decided that such words were "no essential part of any exposition of ideas"
and of "slight social value." Id. The Court subsequently placed some limitations on the
doctrine. See, e.g., Cohen v. Califorma, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Termniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
4 Afro-American Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating
that the law of libel protects the interest in reputation which is "inherent in the
essential dignity and worth of every human being"); see also Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 49 (1971); Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court
of Napa County, 70 Cal. App. 3d 543, 549 (1985); Phillips v. Evemng Star
Newspaper, 424 A.2d 78, 87 (D.C. 1980).
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and fighting words cases, courts have had some success m fashioning workable
standards to measure these competing interests in defamation cases.5
Defamation in fictional works presents a particularly thorny problem for
the courts. Defamation in fiction refers to situations in which a real person
allegedly is defamed through the use of that person's name or personality m the
development of characters within a fictional work. "Fiction" is a distinct
category of communication and necessarily must be approached differently than
political advertisements, newspaper articles, or other fact-based vehicles of
expression. Should fiction receive any First Amendment protection at all?
Should the courts craft a different level of protection for fiction than for other
categories of communication? The author of fiction has clearly created a work
predicated on imagination-the writer's work does not purport to be factual.
The very essence of fiction implies an escape from fact or reality. As such, it
would seem impossible to sustain successfully a libel action for defamation in
fiction, because the work itself does not purport to be a statement of reality.
However, courts have recognized thatit is indeed possible for a plaintiff to be
defamed through a fictional medium.6 Courts have struggled to devise a
workable standard to accommodate the nuances that are unique to defamation in
fiction. 7 No single test has proved satisfactory m handling fiction m general. In
addition, the various genres that emerge within the broad category known as
fiction pose additional challenges in applying a single workable standard.8
This Article proposes a new approach for defamation in fiction, which
advocates the use of a classical malice fault standard. The term "classical
malice" refers to the common-law definition of malice as "spite" or "ill will." 9
5 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); see znfra Part II.
6 E.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980); Bindnm v. Mitchell, 155
Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal Ct. App.), cen. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979); Corrgan v. Bobbs-
Merrill, Co., 126 N.E. 260 (N.Y. 1920).
7 See cases cited supra note 5.
8 See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
9 State courts have often confused the definitions of classical malice and constitutional
malice because both types of malice have been interchangeably labeled "actual malice." For
a definition of constitutional malice, see infra note 10 and accompanying text. State courts
have attempted to clarify the difference between these terms:
We note at the outset that the concept of actual malice in public-official defamation
cases involving media defendants should not be confused with the traditional common-
law standard of actual malice. In the common law, actual malice connotes ill-will,
hatred, a spirit of revenge, or a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other
persons wich has a great probability of causing substantial harm.
[Vol. 55:187
DEFAMATION IN FICTION
This definition is distinguishable from the constitutional malice standard
defined in the watershed case of New York Tmes v. Sdlivan.10 The classical
malice fault standard alleviates the inadequacies of the current fault standards
that courts apply to defamation in fiction. The classical malice fault standard
will yield the best results, whether applied to pure fiction, "faction," 1I roman a
clef,12 or docudrama. 13 With the exception of absolute First Amendment
protection for authors and other creators of fiction, the classical malice standard
affords the greatest protection for the author's freedom of speech.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THR LAW OF DEFAMATON AND ITs ROOTS
IN THE COMMON LAW
The current status of the law of defamation is not equipped to diffuse the
difficulties that arise from defamation m fiction. To understand the
inadequacies of the present state of the -law, one must analyze the evolution of
common-law libel.
Varanese v. Gall, 518 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ohio 1988); see also Burnett v. National
Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Silbowitz v. Lepper, 299
N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 (1969); Jacobs v. Frank, 573 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ohio 1991).
10 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Constitutional malice was defined by the Supreme Court as
"knowledge of falsity" or "reckless disregard thereof." Id. at 286-87 Hereinafter, the term
"classical malice" will be used to refer to "ill will" and the term "constitutional malice" will
be used to refer to the New York Tunes malice standard.
II The genre of "faction" uses names of famous people, many of whom are still living,
but asserts that it is placing them m fictitious situations. One scholar defines the novel of
faction as one that "adheres fairly closely to lustoncal fact as a foundation for psychological
speculation about-or 'mythologizing' of-the real persons and events it describes." Isidore
Silver, Libel, The "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV
1065, 1067 n.10 (1978). Silver suggests that Alex Haley's Roots may have inspired the
term.
12 The roman a clef is "a novel that represents lustorical events and characters under
the guise of fiction." THE RANDoM House DICIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1242
(1967).
13 A docudrama is defined as a theatrical, television, or motion picture production that
uses real people as central characters "to enhance the impact of, and lend credibility to, the
fictionalized events." David A. Anderson, Avoiding Defamation Problems in Fiction, 51
BROOK. L. REv. 383, 393 n.57 (1984) (citing Victor A. Kovner, The Great Docudrama
Controversy-Elizabeth Taylor and ABC, 1 CoMM. & L. 1 (1983)).
Docudramas are distinguishable from documentaries. A documentary is "a non-
fictional story or series of historical events portrayed m their actual location; a film of real
people and real events as they occur. A documentary maintains strict fidelity to fact." Davis
v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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A. Defamation at Common Law
To sustain a libel action at common law, the plaintiff had to prove that
defendant: (1) published; 14 (2) a defamatory statement;15 (3) of and concerning
the plaintiff.' 6  The important distinction between the common-law
requirements for libel and the current constitutional requirements for
defamation rests in the absence of a fault standard at common law. At common
law, if a plaintiff could prove that the defendant had published a defamatory
statement of and concerning the plaintiff, he or she could sustain a libel action
without any proof of fault by the defendant.' 7
The common-law case of Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill, Co. 18 illustrates the
no-fault standard as applied to a work of fiction. In Corrigan, the court refused
to recognize defendant publisher's assertion that it had no actual intent to
defame plaintiff. The court stated:
14 Publication of defamatory matter is communication, intentionally or by a negligent
act, to one other than the person defamed. RESTATEmEN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577
(1989). Tis definition of publication emphasizes that defamation is a three-party tort.
15 The determination of what is defamatory depends largely upon context. Under the
early common-law formulation, the defamatory utterance was any utterance that would hold
the plaintiff up to "public ridicule, obloquy or contempt." See, e.g., Sweeney v.
Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1941); Berg v. Printers' Ink Pub.
Co., 54 F. Supp. 795, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F Supp.
24, 31 (E.D. Wash. 1943); Sweeney v. Caller-Times Pub. Co., 41 F. Supp. 163, 169
(S.D. Tex. 1941). More recent formulations state that a statement is defamatory if it "tends
to dimnish the esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or if it
tends to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions about the plaintiff."
Davis, 619 F. Supp. at 1375.
16 A modem formulation of this common-law requirement exists in the Restatement.
"A defamatory communication is made concerning the person to whom its recipient
correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to refer."
RESTATEmENr (SECOND) oFTORTS § 564 (1989).
17 E.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 126 N.E. 260 (N.Y. 1920); see infra notes
18-20 and accompanying text.
18 126 N.E. 260 (N.Y. 1920). In Comgan, plaintiff, New York magistrate, Joseph E.
Corrigan, brought a libel action against the publisher of a novel entitled God's Man, which
offensively depicted a magistrate named "Cornmgan." The novel portrayed "Corningan" as
an associate of low and depraved character, with the following description of the character
appearing in a chapter entitled "Justice - a la Congan" (another variation in spelling that
appeared in the novel) in the table of contents: "ignorant, brutal, hypocritical, corrupt,
shunned by his fellows, bestial of countenance, unjust, dominated by political influences in
making decisions, and grossly unfit for his place." Id. at 262.
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The fact that the publisher has no actual- intention to defame a
particular man or indeed to injure any one does not prevent recovery of
compensatory damages by one who connects himself with the
publication.. . The question is not so much who was aimed at as who
was hit .... Just as the defendant could not excuse himself from malice
by proving that he wrote it in the most benevolent spirit, so he cannot show
that the libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff by proving that he
never heard of the plaintiff.19
The absence of a fault standard at common law essentially made libel a strict
liability tort for purposes of recovering compensatory damages.20
As the law of defamation evolved, the Supreme Court recognized that a no-
fault standard was not attractive, particularly when reviewed m tandem with
free speech considerations. A strict liability approach was an impediment to the
author's right to express his or her ideas. It became clear that the no-fault
standard would stifle the artist's desire to publish his or her creations because
the common-law no-fault standard had facilitated the success of libel actions.
The court in Clare v. Farrell2' emphasized this notion: "At least some latitude
must be green authors in their selection of names for characters so that the
production of fictional literature may continue, and the mean, the base, and the
good of the characters therein fearlessly portrayed." 22
Without some greater protection afforded authors, self-censorship would
necessarily spring up in the literary community. 23 Creators of fiction would be
prevented from sharing their creations with others as the result of
apprehensions of defending oneself in potential libel actions. The First
Amendment was designed to protect the free exchange of ideas and prevent
such chilling effects on freedom of speech. 24
19 Id. at 261.
20 Donald Meltzer, Note, Toward a New Standard of Lzability for Defamation in
Fiction, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1115, 1126 (1983).
21 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947).
2 2 Id. at 279.
23 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 154, 159 (1979) ("These cases rested primarily on the
conviction that the common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press and... to avoid self-
censorship .... "); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (concluding that
strict liability, which compels a publisher to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions,
may lead to "intolerable self-censorship"); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
50 (1971) ("Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship and thus create a
danger that the legitimate utterance will be deterred.").
24 Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Douglas, I., concurring) ("Once we
narrow the ambit of the First Amendment, creative writing is imperiled and the 'chilling
effect' on free expression... is almost sure to take place."); see also Dombroska v. Pfister,
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B. The Constitutionalization of a Fault Standard
In 1964, in response to the stifling effect of strict liability on the free
exchange of ideas, the Supreme Court decided New York Tmes v. Sullivan.25
In New York limes, the Supreme Court rejected strict liability and introduced a
fault standard into the law of defamation. The Court concluded that a public
official suing for defamation must prove constitutional malice.26 The plaintiff
must show that the author knew that his or her statement was false,27 or that he
or she acted with reckless disregrd for the truth or falsity of his or her
statement.28 This standard was later extended to include "public figures." 29
In addition to the application of the New York Tmes constitutional malice
standard to public officials, the Court devised a standard of fault for private
plaintiffs suing for defamation. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,30 the Supreme
Court again rejected strict liability as too burdensome on the media. The
private plaintiff was required to prove that the publisher or broadcaster had
negligently published a false and defamatory statement. 31
New York Times and Gertz made strides toward greater protection for the
author's right to free speech. New York limes catalyzed procedural changes in
the law of defamation that created a larger hurdle to plaintiff's success. 32
380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Naantaanbuu v. Abernathy, 816 F. Supp. 218, 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 585 P.2d 572 (Ca. 1978).
25 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26 Id. at 286-87. In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), the
Court emphasized the distinction between the New York 7Tmes test of knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth and actual malice m the traditional sense of ill will.27 Becldey Newspapers Corp., 389 U.S. at 81.
28 Id. Reckless disregard is not as clearly identifiable as knowledge of falsity. The first
case that attempted to-define reckless disregard was St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968). In St. Amant, the Court held that there must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
Id. The Court equated "reckless disregard" for the truth with "subjective awareness of
probable falsity." Id. at 731.
29 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
30 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31 Id.
32 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) mandated procedural changes
for defamation actions, in addition to the substantive change of establishing a fault standard.
Procedural changes included: (1) At common law, defendant had the burden of proving the
truth of the utterance. Under New York limes, the burden of proof shifted to plaintiff. Id. at
281. (2) At common law, the quantum of proof was a preponderance of the evidence.
Under New York Tmes, fault must be proven with convincing clarity. Id. at 285-86. (3) At
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Although the New York Tunes and Gertz standards afford greater protection for
free speech than did the common law, these standards are not appropriate when
applied to defamation in the context of fiction. Both the New York Tnes and
Gertz opinions resulted from actions brought against media defendants. In
addition, the rules of New York Tmes and Gertz were created to protect
political speech, not creative fiction.33 The fault standards of New York Times
and Gertz are not successfully transferred to defamation m fiction.
III. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS OF DEFAMATION IN FICTION
The most formidable stumbling block for defamation in fiction is the lack
of a suitable fault standard specifically tailored to fiction cases. This problem is
largely a definitional one. Fiction is really a middle ground between truth and
falsity.34 The New York Tmes standard focuses on the author's knowledge of
the truth or falsity of his or her statement. Under New York Times, defendant's
knowledge of falsity gives rise to liability under the constitutional malice fault
standard. 35 Yet, ironically, fiction is inherently based on falsehood. The author
of fiction knows that he or she is writing something "false." Indeed, the reader
common law, appellate review was based on a clearly erroneous standard. Under New York
Times, appellate review is de novo. Id. at 295.
33 In New York Tmes, the Commissioner of the Montgomery Police Department
brought a libel action against The New York Times alleging that he was defamed by an
advertisement that appeared m defendant's newspaper. New York Tmes, 376 U.S. at 256.
The advertisement was a political advertisement that criticized the police force m
Montgomery, Alabama and stated that the police had terrorized Martin Luther King, Jr. and
his followers. Although plaintiff's name was not contained m the advertisement, plamtiff
contended that the criticism of the police implied harm to his reputation as Commissioner.
The United States Supreme Court found for defendant because plaintiff had failed to prove
constitutional malice. The subject of the work was a political advertisement, not a work of
fiction.
In Gertz, plamtiff filed a defamation claim a'gamst a magazine, American Opimon,
which labeled Gertz as a "Lemnist" and a "Commumst-fronter." Gertz, 418 U.S. 323
(1974). The article stated that Gertz had been an officer m the National Lawyer's Guild,
described as a Communist organization that "probably did more than any other outfit to
plan the Communist attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention."
Id. at 326.
34 "All fiction, by definition, eschews an obligation to be faithful to historical
truth. Every fiction writer knows that his creation is in some sense false." Miss
America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D.N.J.
1981); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (Ca. 1979). See
generally R. Bruce Rich & Livia D. Brilliant, Defamation-zn-Fiction: The Limited
Viability of Alternative Causes of Action, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986).
35 New York Times, 376 U.S. 2541.
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of fiction likewise knows that he or she is reading a work which does not
purport to be true. The New York Times test immediately triggers liability based
on the author's knowledge of falsity, while falsity or creation of illusion is
itself the heart of fiction. In response, courts and commentators have suggested
a variety of approaches in resolving the defamation in fiction conflict. Two of
these approaches are discussed below.
A. Fiction as False Speech
Because fiction is inherently false in nature, perhaps fictional works should
simply be treated as false speech. If fiction is to be treated as false speech, the
application of the Gertz and New York Tunes standards to fiction would seem
appropriate. As the Court in Gertz stated: "There is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact." 36 Under the Gertz and New York Tmes tests, such
false speech is not afforded constitutional protection. This proposition that
fiction is false speech and thus unprotected by the Constitution has a
devastatingly chilling effect on free speech and the open exchange of ideas.
This approach was followed by the court m Bindrum v. Mitchell.37 In
Bindrim, plaintiff psychologist sued defendant for defamation based upon the
author's portrayal of plaintiff conducting nude group therapy sessions in a book
called Touching. Plaintiff alleged that he was injured by defendant's maccurate
portrayal of the event, including plaintiff's use of obscene language which
plaintiff claimed he did not m fact use. Defendant asserted that Touching was a
fictional novel, thus insulating her from liability for libel. The Bindrim court
found for plaintiff and reasoned that fiction is, by definition, untrue. Defendant
attended the session and was aware of the events which occurred. The court
therefore reasoned that she had written the novel with actual malice, possessing
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard thereof.38 Thus, defendant met the
fault standard of New York Times.
This approach- yields poor results. Fiction does not fit neatly into the
category of false speech. Such a characterization strips fiction of any First
Amendment protection. Under this formulation, all fiction would meet the
constitutional malice test of New York limes because it is predicated on
imagination. One commentator aptly presents a distinction between fiction and
falsehood: "[W]hile falsehood is presented in the guise of a literal rendering of
reality, fiction is not." 39
36 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
37 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).3 8 Id.
3 9 Diane L. Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About
Troublesome Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROoK. L. REv. 355, 361 (1984).
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Advocates of the "false speech" approach -will argue that fiction is
predicated on some higher form of reality. In some instances, reality does
indeed have an effect on the author's portrayal of fiction. Virtually all writers
rely to some extent on personal experience for their material-real people who
are part of the author's creative experience inevitably play a role m their
work.40 F. Scott Fitzgerald used "real" persons41 in his classic novel, The
Great Gatsby.42 Mark Twain wrote Hucklebeny Finn43 and The Adventures of
Tom Saiyer44 drawing from memories of his childhood home, Hannibal,
Missouri. Fellow writers were used by Charles Dickens as models for his
characters in Bleak House.45 Scholar Frederick Schauer appreciated the
richness of the interface between fiction and reality when he wrote:
40 Literary movements have even focused on the use of reality in crafting literature.
The late nineteenth century movement of "realism" encouraged a specific connection
between the "real" world and the world of the story. ROBERT SCHOLES & ROBERT
KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATiVE 86 (1966). Critics Scholes and Kellogg observed,
"Robinson Csusoe is not a real individual but he is an attempt to present an individual
whose most important attribute is that he may pass for real." Id. at 87.
See also DoIus ALEXANDER, CREATING CHARACTERs wrrH CHARLEs DIcKENs (1991);
ROBERT ALTER, MoTIVEs FOR FICTION (1984); MORROB BERGER, REAL AND IMAGINED
WORLDs (1977); ZULFKAR GHOSE, THE FIcnoN OF REAL1TY (1983); HERBERT
LiNDENBERGER, HISTORICAL DRAMA, THE RELATION OF LrrERATURE AND REALrrY (1975);
THoMAs F. PETUSO, LIFE MADE REAL, CHARACTERiZATION IN THE NOVEL SINCE PROUST
AND JOYCE (1991).
4 1 H.D. PIPER, THE GREAT GATSBY: TnE NOvEL, THE CRITICS, THE BACKGROUND
171-97 (1970) dted in Silver, supra note 11 at 1067 n.10.
42 F. SCOTT FiTZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (1st Macmillan/Hudson River ed.
1988) (1925).
43 MARK TWAIN, HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Nelson Doubleday 1970) (1885).
44 MARK TWAIN, THE ADvENTURES OF TOM SAWYER (Pendulum Press 1973) (1876).
45 CHARLEs DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).
At least four familiar fellow writers were used as models for the characters of Bleak House.
The poet Samuel Rogers represented the character of Grandfather Smallweed, the
monstrous old moneylender. ALExANDER, supra note 40. The character of Krook was
"borrowed" from the characteristics of playwright John Poole. Id. at 40. Dickens's old
friend, Leigh Hunt, was represented as character Harold Skimpole. Id. at 42. The physique
and personality of poet John Kenyon were embodied in the character of Reverend Mr.
Chadband. Id. at 48.
Dickens's acquaintance with Dutch writer Hans Christian Anderson is reflected in Is
autobiographical novel, David Copperfiek. CHARLES DICKENS, DAvID COPPERFIELD (Nina
Burgis ed., Pengum Books 1981) (1850). Anderson is portrayed through the character of
Uriah Heep, while David Copperfield embodies the author himself. ALEXANDER, supra note
40, at 78.
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A great deal of fiction trades precisely on the way in which fictional
representations are hooked onto the real world. The Grapes of Wrath
would not have been the novel it was had it not been for the existence of
real dust bowls, real hunger and real "Okies." Our reaction to A Tale of
Tw Cities would have been quite different had there been no French
Revolution. 46
Elements of reality are often used as a tool to make a work of fiction more
believable.
Even though a reader knows that he or she is reading a work of fiction,
one might argue that such fiction" still has a great impact on the reader's
perception of reality. A reader's once romanticized perception of life at sea
may be forever tarnished upon reading about Ishmael's hardships m Moby
Dick.47 While fiction may have an impact on shaping one's perception of
reality, it is nonetheless improper to classify fiction as false speech. Works of
fiction are not ultimately created with the purpose of conveying literal truth. As
critic Diane L. Zimmerman wrote: "The readers of fiction... recognize that
even those bits of reality tucked into a novel or play are subtly altered by their
presence m'the fictional universe; thus, 'fictional' reality is taken out of the
realm of literal truth." 48
A distinction exists between fictional reality and literal reality. There are
three primary reasons why courts must recognize this distinction and .protect
the interests of the author.
1. The Reader's Perceptions
The reader's expectations and perceptions play a large role m the tension
between the interests of the reader and the author. The author's ability to
change a reader's perception about reality is indeed a powerful ability.
Nonetheless, a reader's changed perceptions of reality are not grounds for
nonprotection of fiction.
"The readers of fiction, at least if they are reasonable, do not bring to a
novel the same expectations and assumptions that they bring to their morning
newspapers." 49 The reader of fiction comes to the novel with the expectation
that he or she is "suspending disbelief" and entering a world of imagination.50
46 Frederick Schauer, Liars, Novelists and the Law of Defarnaion, 51 BROOK. L. REv
233,261 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
4 7 HERMAN MELViLLE, MoBY DICK (Raintree Publishers 1982) (1851).
48 Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 361.
49 Id.
5 0 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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This expectation is strongest for "pure fiction," but it is also present for the
roman a clef scenario. 51 Real persons may be used as models for characters,
but the characters are presented in a mode of fiction. If the reader's perception
changes as a result of reading, the author should not be held accountable for
that change when his or her work has purported to be fiction. For example,
although the reader of Mitchell's Touching may have changed his perception of
Dr. Bindrim upon reading the novel, the work was clearly fictional in nature
and presented no conveyance of literal truth.52 If a work is clearly fictional and
does not purport to be otherwise, authors must not be punished for being good
at what they do-for telling a believable story.
The author's power to affect a reader's perceptions undoubtedly impacts
the tension between defendant's free speech and plaintiff's reputational interest.
However, while Dr. Bindrim's reputational interest was at stake, it is not clear
that harm can come to a reputation when the novel is predicated on the
understanding that this is a work of fiction. 53 Certainly, critics are astute m
their concern regarding the durational aspect of the written word.54 In the sense
that the printed and spoken word can never truly be "taken back," some harm
to reputation must be conceded. A plaintiff can never be made completely
whole from the damage of hurtful words, whether defamatory or not.55 Indeed,
retraction often highlights the controversy over one's reputation, rather than
completely exonerating plaintiff and cleansing the harm to plaintiff's
reputation. 56 Even if some reputational harm were to result, on balance, the
scales must tip m favor of the author's free speech protections and away from
this brand of self-censorship advocated by the Bindrim decision. Harm to the
51 See mfra PartIV.C. 1 &2.
52 Supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
53 Supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
54 See generally Marc A. Franklin, Fiction, Libel and the First Amendment, 51
BROOK. L. RLrv. 269 (1985); Martin Garbus & Richard Kurnit, Libel Camns Based on
Fiction Should Be Lightly Disnrssed, 51 BROOK. L. REv 401 (1985).
55 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
56 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52, ("False statements of fact are particularly valueless;
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they
cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counter
speech, however persuasive or effective.") (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 340, 344 n.9 (1974); Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971)
("Demals, restrictions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the
prominence of the original story."). But see American Postal Workers Umon v.
United States Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294, 307 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Thus, any
harm that might be presumed to have resulted from Gordon's statements must equally
be presumed to have been largely or wholly dissipated by his retraction.").
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reputational interest of the plaintiff is discussed further in the framework of
classical malice in Part IV of this Article.
2. The Disclaimer
Many authors of fiction clearly mark their work with disclaimers that alert
the reader that the work is purely fictional. A legend at the beginning of a book
that states: "The characters m this book are fictitious; any resemblance to living
persons is purely coincidental," should be enough to immunize the author from
liability.57
Some commentators and courts disagree with this proposition. One
commentator speculates that this phrase is probably meaningless if a real person
is intended as a model for the fictional character.58 In Corn gan v. Bobbs-
Merrill, Co., the New York Court of Appeals wrote, "Reputations may not be
traduced with impunity, whether under -the literary forms of a work of fiction,
or in jest."5 9
The purpose of the disclaimer is twofold. The author's* concern, of course,
is to shield.himself or herself from liability. 60 However, he or she is also
interested in protecting the identity of his or her characters and helping to
control the reader's perception that the story is indeed fictional. 61 Such a
disclaimer should function as evidence of the author's intent not to harm
plaintiff under the classical malice analysis. While the author's motivation is
partly self-interest; it is also to prevent reputational harm from befalling a
potential plaintiff.
57 For a discussion of disclaimers see David A. Anderson, Defamation in Fiction:
Avozding Defamation Problems in Fiction, 51 BROOK. L. Rnv. 383 (1985); Paul A.
LeBel, Defamation in Fiction: The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of
Fiction: Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOK. L. REv 281 (1985). See, e.g.,
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 48 (containing advertisement disclaimer indicating that it was
parody and not to be taken seriously); Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 638 (2d
Cir. 1980) (purporting to be work of fiction, a book, on its frontispiece set forth the
standard disclaimer of intentional resemblance between its characters or episodes and
real persons or actual incidents); Kelly v. Loew's, 76 F. Supp. 473, 480 (D. Mass.
1948) (contaimng customary legend that "The events, characters, and firms depicted
in this photoplay are fictitious. Any similarity to actual persons, living or dead, or to
actual firms is purely coincidental.").
5 8 PHLLip WrrrEmERG, THE PROTECTiON OF LnTERARY PROPFRTY 216 (1978).
59 Comgan v. Bobbs-Mertill, Co.,126 N.E. 260, 262 (N.Y. 1920).
60 E.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F Supp. 1408, 1416 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) ("Although this type of disclaimer may be seen as highly self-serving, it





3. Promotion ofArtistic Expression
Literature offers Americans the opportunity for culture and escapism. In
this era of video games and visual media, it is undesirable to foster a policy that
thwarts the creativity of writers of literature. By imposing liability for a failed
disguise 62 or coincidental name use,63 the richness of literature is likely to be
overshadowed by self-censorship on behalf of the literary community. After all,
if Charles Dickens had feared liability for similarities between his
contemporary writers and his characters in Bleak House,64 the world nught
have been deprived of a classic work of literature. An author must be permitted
to draw on real-life experiences in fashioning a believable and entertaining
work of fiction.
B. Fiction is Constitutionally Protected as Opinion
Some commentators have suggested that fiction should'be viewed as purely
opinion, thus girding constitutional protection. 65 As the Court stated in Gertz,
"Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 66
While it is clear that a defamatory utterance must be bottomed on fact to be
actionable, the task of distinguishing fact from opinion is not always a simple
one. There are contexts in which a statement may blend elements of fact and
opinion, posing an ambiguity as to the author's intent. An example of
ambiguity in the fact/opinion area is the "op-ed" section of a newspaper. 67 The
term itself implies a blending of fact and opinion. "Op" implies opinion, while
"ed" implies editorial, which is usually based on a blend of facts and
6 2 Infra note 114.
63 Infra note 90 and accompanying text.
6 4 See supra note 45 and accompanying text for an explanation of Charles Dickens's
use of real persons, contemporary writers, as models for his characters in Bleak House.
65 Schauer, supra note 46, at 260.
66 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
67 See, e.g., Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disputing contents
of op-ed column that quoted an unnamed political scientist as saying, "Ollman has no
status within the profession, but is a pure and simple activist."), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985), quoted in Vincent Brannigan and Bruce Ensor, Speech and the First
Amendment: Did Bose Speak Too Softly? Product Critiques and the First Amendment,
14 HOFSTRA L. Rnv. 571, 596 (1986).
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editorializing. Courts have struggled to resolve the ambiguities surrounding the
fact/opinion area.68
Resolving the ambiguities between fact and opinion is equally troublesome
for fiction. The author will assert that his or her work is purely opinion and
protected free speech. However, earlier discussion has shown that writers often
rely on real people and real experiences in crafting their fiction. The genre of
faction is, by definition, a blend between fact and fiction.69 Casting faction as
pure opinion would be counterintuitive because there are elements of fact
within such a genre. Casting fiction as opinion may be workable in application
to pure fiction. However, it fails when applied to faction, wich, again, blends
elements of fact and opinion. The classification of fiction as opinion would not
put the author in any better position than under the New York imes standard,
because the plaintiff could defeat defendant by presenting enough evidence to
show that there were significant elements of fact present in the work of the
author. If the plaintiff could convince the jury that a reasonable reader would
perceive defendant's work as factual in some aspects, defendant may indeed be
left with less protection than he would be afforded under the constitutional
malice fault standard in New York Tmes.
Protection of fiction as opinion was invoked as a rationale by the court in
Pring v. Penthouse.70 Although the outcome of this case was correct, the
court's rationale is not satisfying. In Pring, plaintiff sued Penthouse magazine
68 In Olman, 750 F.2d 970, the court constitutionalized the fact/opuuon area, making
the issue a question of law for the judge to decide. This case gave absolute privilege for
opinion. The court suggested a four-factor test for the judge to consider whether a statement
was fact or opinion: (1) the specific language used; (2) whether the statement is verifiable;
(3) the general context of the statement; (4) the broader social context in which the
statement appeared. Id. at 979.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected the Olman test and rejected any
constitutional privilege for opinion. In Milkovitch v. News-Herald, 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the
Court posed the following inquiry: Is the real unport of the utterance capable of being
proven true or false? Although the Court announced the test to resolve the ambiguity
between fact and opinion, the Court was gilent on the issue of whether the judge or jury
would resolve the question.
The fact/opinon area has been riddled with controversy and confusion. The current
status of law appears to favor the jury in making the determination of fact or opinion based
on what a reasonable reader would perceive. See, e.g., Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572 (Ca. 1978), cert. demed, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); see
also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 (1989) ("A defamatory communication may
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is only
actionable if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion.").
69 See supra note 11 for a definition of faction.
70 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1983).
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for defamation. The magazine contained an article that described Miss
Wyoming performing bizarre sexual acts with a male companion. The court
found that the story was merely an attempt to ridicule the Miss America contest
and could not be taken as true.71 The court noted:
The First Amendment is not limited to ideas, statements, or positions
which are accepted; which are not outrageous; which are decent and
popular; which are constructive or have some redeeming element; or which
do not deviate from community standards and norms; or which are within
prevailing religious or moral standards. 72
Because no reasonable reader could perceive the Penthouse article as truth, the
court protected defendant's freedom of speech, despite the repugnance of the
article's contents.73
In Pring, the determination of whether the article was opinion was
approached by focusing on the perception of the reader. The court's approach
in Pring would have been more sound if the court had looked to the intent of
the author. The author's use of ridicule or rhetorical hyperbole was not meant
to convey truth. The article was merely a brand of black humor. Evaluating an
article as opinion subjects the author to the whim of the reader's perception if
the article is deemed ambiguous. 74 If ambiguity exists, the jury will probably
determine whether a reasonable person would perceive the article as fact or
opinion. 75 This result is undesirable. Instead, the level of protection afforded to
the article should be determined by looking at the intent of the author, not the
perception of the reader. The classical malice standard of fault should have
been invoked in this case to shield defendant from liability. This will be
discussed in greater detail in Part IV, which considers the propriety of a
classical malice standard of fault.
IV. CLASSICAL MALICE AS A MEASURE OF FAULT
FOR DEFAMATION IN FICTION
As an alternative to the New York Tunes and Gertz fault standards, classical
malice is the proper standard to apply to defamation in fiction cases. Classical
malice considers the state of mind of the author, rather than the perception of
the reader. The focus of a classical malice inquiry rests in an exploration of the
71 Id.
72 Id. at 443.
73 Id.
74 Supra note 68.
75 Supra note 68.
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intention of the author in publishing his work. Did the author harbor ill will or
spiteful motivations in his utterance about plaintiff? This test should be
employed for all fiction cases, regardless of the genre of fiction at issue. The
classical malice standard affords protection to the author's freedom of speech,
which permits creative works to flourish and abound without restriction,
enabling all of society to enjoy fiction.
A. The Classical Malice Standard Applies to All Plaintiffs
The classical malice standard ,is attractive because it can be uniformly
applied to all fiction cases, regardless of the status of the plaintiff. Under the
New York Tunes standard, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard thereof is
the standard of fault for plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures. 76
Under Gertz, negligence is the fault standard for private plaintiffs in an action
that is a matter of public concern. 77 The classical malice standard does not
distinguish between public or private plaintiffs. The classical malice standard
applies to all plaintiffs, regardless of status.
This application to public and private plaintiffs alike is plausible because
the traditional concept of ill will does not discriminate between public or
private plaintiffs. If the plaintiff can prove that defendant acted with ill will,
there is no other degree of fault required. The New York Tunes actual malice
test simply does not provide enough protection to the creative rights, of the
author.78 The Gertz negligence standard is even less protective of free
speech. 79 If an author has acted with ill will, plaintiff should find relief
regardless of whether he or she is a private or public figure. Conversely, if the
author did not intend any ill will or classical malice, a plaintiff's showing of
knowledge of falsity, reckless disregard of falsity, or negligence should not be
enough to trigger liability.
B. Classical Malice Is Appropriate Because Fiction Should Be Granted
Greater Protection than Utterances thbt Purport to Be Factual
Fiction deserves a higher level of protection because the author of fiction
does not hold his or her work out to the public as an assertion of fact. Fiction
is designed for the reader as an escape from reality into a world of fantasy The
plaintiff in a defamation in fiction case must prove more than knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard thereof.
76 Supra notes 26, 29 and accompanying text.
77 Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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There is an inherent paradox in applying the New York limes standard to
fiction. Because fiction is paradoxically knowledge of falsity, the New York
Times standard offers no protection for the creator of fiction. Therefore, the
higher standard of classical malice must logically apply. As explained earlier, it
is unsatisfactory to apply constitutional malice to fiction by classifying fiction
as false speech.
C. Classical Malice Is Applicable To All Genres of Fiction
The classical malice standard of fault is applicable to all genres of fiction,
whether pure fiction, roman a clef, faction, or docudrama. Before considering
the classical malice standard as applied to each of these types of fiction, an
explanation of the "of and concerning" requirement is necessary.
As mentioned in Part II.A, one of the common-law requirements for
sustaining a defamation action in nonfiction cases is proof that the defamatory
statement is of and concerning the plaintiff.80 The of and concerning
requirement is particularly important in fiction cases because the identification
of a real person within a fictional work is often challenging. 81 Because the
author presents his work as fiction, there is a presumption that the characters
within the fictional work are not real persons and that the work should not be
literally interpreted. 82 Proof that the fictional work contains portions of and
concerning the plaintiff has been a central dilemma for plaintiffs in defamation
in fiction cases.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 564 suggests that the of and
concerning requirement is measured in terms of the perceptions of a
"reasonable reader." 83 Comment d of Section 564 makes specific reference to
fictitious characters. 84 Comment d states that:
A libel may be published of an actual person by a story or essay, novel,
play or moving picture that is intended to deal only with fictitious
characters if the characters or plot bear, such a resemblance to actual
80 Supra note 16.
81 In Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969), plaintiff,
Larry Esco Middlebrooks, sued for libel alleging that he was defamed in a magazine story
featuiing a teenager named "Esco Brooks," who committed a number of thefts. The court
of appeals found that the of and concerning requirement had not been satisfied. There were
marked dissimilarities between the fictional character in the magazine story and plaintiff,
such as differences in ages and employment. ld. at 143.
82 As previously discussed, readers do not bring the same expectations to fiction as
they bring to factual works such as newspapers. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1989).
84 Id. cmt. d.
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persons or events as to make it reasonable for its readers or audience to
understand that a particular character is intended to portray that
person.... If the work is reasonably understood as portraying an actual
person, it is not decisive that the author or playwright did not so intend.85
Thus, the Restatement supports a reasonable reader test for ascertaining
whether the of and concerning requirement has been satisfied. Regardless of the
author's intent, under the Restatement formulation, the reader's perception is
used to determine if the work is of and concerning the plaintiff. A majority of
jurisdictions have adopted this reasonable reader test. 86 The problems
associated with the of and concerning requirement will now be considered in
conjunction with the classical malice fault standard for various genres of
fiction.
1. Pure-Fiction
The term pure fiction is somewhat misleading. As mentioned earlier, it is
questionable whether any fiction is truly pure because elements of reality are
often synthesized into fictional works. 87 Nonetheless, pure fiction connotes
fiction that is capable of successfully suspending a reader's view of reality in
favor of an escape to the fictional medium. 88 There exists an implicit
understanding between the author and reader that both are engaging in a.similar
form of escapism. "The more closely that scenes in the work are tied to, or
incorporate wholesale, actual people or events, the less likely that the reader
will approach the work as something that requires suspension of disbelief." 89
Pure fiction exists when the author succeeds m convincing the reader that the
fictional work is a suspension of reality.
85 Id. (emphasis added).
86 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp., 107 N.E.2d 295 (Mass. 1952) (surrounding a
mistake in a magazine article as to the identity of an American soldier court-martialed in
Germany); Coats v. News Corp., 197 S.W.2d 958 (Mo. 1946) (surrounding a mistaken use
of plaintiffs picture in an article about jailbreak by a person with the same name as the
plaintiff) cited zn Silver, supra note 11 at 1085 n.76.
87 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
88 LeBel, supra note 57, at 321-22. Critic Paul A. LeBel analogizes this quality to
Samuel A. Coleridge's early nineteenth century notion of "poetic faith." Id. at 321 n.162
(citing 7:I SAMUEL T. COLERIDGE, II Biographia Literana 6, zn THE COLLECrED WORKS
OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 6 (1983)). Coleridge's "willing suspension of disbelief for
the moment" is analogous to the concept of pure fiction. Id.89 LeBel, supra note 57, at 322.
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a. Coincidental Use of Real Name
This section refers to pure fiction in which the author inadvertently uses
the plaintiff's name in his work without any knowledge of the existence of the
plaintiff.90 This presents an easy case for absolving the defendant from
liability.
First, it seems that the of and concerning requirement would not be
satisfied. The author had no intention of writing about the plaintiff. Clearly, in
the author's mind, his work was not of and concerning the plaintiff. The
coincidental use of the plaintiff's name was not intended to refer to plaintiff.
Under the Restatement formulation, however, this is not the result.91 The
Restatement test concerns the perceptions of the reasonable reader.92 Thus, if a
reasonable reader could see a resemblance of the fictional character and
plaintiff, the plaintiff would fulfill the of and concerning requirement even
though use of plaintiff's name was merely a coincidence.
Notwithstanding satisfaction of the of and concerning requirement, the
classical malice standard of fault would shield defendant from liability in the
case of the coincidental use of a real person's name. Because there was no spite
or ill will on behalf of defendant, plaintiff would fail to meet the burden of
clear and convincing evidence of fault. Clearly, the defendant could not intend
harm to a plaintiff whom he did not even know.
The scenario of coincidental use of a real name is exemplified m the case
of Clare v. Farrell.93 In lare, plaintiff sued for defamation when his name
appeared as the title of a novel. 94 The plaintiff's name was the same as that of
the main character, an aspiring young writer with what the court described as a
"sordid life."95 The court held that plaintiff had no cause of action because
defendant had never heard of the plaintiff, nor had any intent to write his novel
about the plaintiff.96 The of and concerning test in Minnesota focused on the
intent of the author,97 as well as the perception of the reasonable reader.98
90 Commentators have referred to this scenario as "the accidental description." See
Mark A. Franklin & Robert Trager, Literature and Libel, 4 COMM.IENT. L.J 205, 229
(1981-82).
91 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
93 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947).
94 Id. at 277.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 277-78.
97 The court in (Jare v. Farrell stated that the Minnesota cases on libel seem to test
"first, whether the author of the defamatory article intended to write of and concerning the
plaintiff, and second, whether it was so understood by those who read the article or by those
who knew of its contents." Care, 70 F. Supp. at 278.
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Under this formulation, the court found that the writing was not of and
concerning the plaintiff.
The result in Clare is correct regarding the of and concerning requirement.
Furthermore, had the classical malice fault standard been utilized, it would
have been impossible to assert fault on behalf of the defendant because he did
not even know the plaintiff. It is clear that defendant could not intend ill will or
harm to an unknown plaintiff. Thus, applying the classical malice standard to
the facts of Clare would yield the same results in favor of defendant.
Commentators have suggested that an author who coincidentally uses the
name of a real person may be liable under a negligence theory. 99 A negligence
standard of fault is not appropriate in this case. The author who does not intend
to depict a real person, and who coincidentally and unfortunately uses the name
of a real person, should not encounter any liability unless there was ill will
involved. 100
b. The "Forgotten Plaintiff""1
This category refers to a plaintiff once known to the defendant, whom the
defendant has since forgotten. This, too, presents a case of nonliability for the
defendant provided that the defendant did not intend ill will toward plaintiff.
Critics Franklin and Trager suggest a duty on behalf of the author to
reasonably remember past acquaintances if the plaintiff and defendant once
98 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test outlined in
the Restatement.
99 Critics Franklin and Trager advocate judicially-declared duties under this scenario.
They give the following example: "[I]f the author places a character in a particular city and
draws that character m a defamatory way, it is not unduly inhibiting to require a search of
that community's telephone book to determine if someone by that name is listed." Franklin
& Trager, supra note 90, at 230.
100 Only one case has been found that imposes'liability on the author in the scenario of
coincidental use of a real name. This was the English case of E. Hulton Co. v. Jones,
[1909] 26 T.L.R. 128 (Eng. C.A.), which permitted plaintiff, Artemus Jones, to sue a
publisher who had used his same name m a fictional context. The Hidton decision turned on
the reasonable reader's understanding of the author's intent. Id. at 129. This case highlights
the merits of examining the intent of the author as opposed to the perceptions of the reader
m determining if the of and concerning requirement has been satisfied. The outcome of this
case raises the question of how many Artemus Joneses can sue the publisher? See Silver,
supra note 11, at 1078. If the classical malice standard had been applied, the defendant
would not have been held liable because defendant had no intent to harm plaintiff.
101 This term was used by critics Franklin and Trager. They explained this scenario as
follows: "The claim is not that a disguise failed-the author did not realize that a disguise
was necessary." Franklin & Trager, supra note 90, at 227-28.
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knew each other well. 102 They advocate a negligence standard of fault, stating
that such a burden is not too onerous for the author. 103 This may be true.
Nonetheless, an author should not be required to scour his memory to
eviscerate all possible resemblances between his fictional characters and real
persons. Regardless of the burden to the author, such an exercise is
unnecessary. The analysis must be made in terms of the intent of the author,
and forgetfulness certainly exculpates the author from liability under the
classical malice standard of fault. It is impossible for a forgetful author to
harbor ill will toward a forgotten person.
Evidence of a once-close relationship between plaintiff and defendant
could, at best, prove useful as a factor in establishing classical malice. If
plaintiff could show that there was a close relationship between plaintiff and
defendant, as well as show that defendant's acquaintance with plaintiff was
fairly recent, this might be used to prove an intent to harm plaintiff. Absent
proof of classical malice, however, no liability should result for defendant.
The case of Geisler v. Petrocelli1 04 sketches the forgotten plaintiff
scenario. Appellant, Melame Geisler, and appellee author worked together in a
small officeof approximately twenty people for a period of nearly six months.
Subsequent to his departure from that employment, appellee .wrote a book in
which the central character, named Melame Geisler, bore a striking
resemblance in physical characteristics and personality to appellant. The
contents of the book were defamatory in nature.105 The court refused appellee's
motion to dismiss and remanded the case.' 06 The court did not decide the issue
of the of and concerning requirement.' 07
102 Id. at 228-29.
103 Id. Franklin and Trager acknowledge that no matter how gross the case,
forgetfulness should invoke the Gertz negligence standard. Id.
104 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
105 Id. The book initially portrayed the character of Geisler as innocent and naive.
However, during the course of the narrative, she is induced to participate m tennis fraud
and untoward sexual conduct that is graphically portrayed. Id. at 637.
106 Id. at 639.
107 Id. The court could have disposed of the case on the of and concerning issue had it
followed the approach of the court m Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F Supp.
1270 (S.D. Olo 1975), aftd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976). The facts of Smrth are similar
to those in Geler. A newspaper printed a story about the effects of a child's drug use on
the family unit. The fictitious names of Mrs. Smith and Randy Smith were used. The real
Mrs. Smith, mother of plaintiff, was one of the speakers who was prominent at a meeting
attended by the reporter. There was no controversy that the reporter did not actually know
that the speakers included Mrs. Smith and that his newspaper had printed some news on the
real Randy some months before. Id. at 1272. The court held that the coincidental use of
plaintiff's name in a newspaper story was insufficient to uphold a libel action. Id. at 1274.
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The court should have applied a classical malice standard, thus sustaining
appellee's motion to dismiss. The author intended the work as pure fiction. He
included a disclaimer at the introduction of his book that denied any
resemblance between his characters and episodes and real persons or actual
incidents. 108 If Geisler truly was "forgotten," as the author asserts, there can
be no hook upon which to hang proof of fault under the classical malice
standard. There was no intent on behalf of the author to harm appellant,
because he had forgotten her very existence. The question of whether he
actually had forgotten Geisler is important in establishing the intent of the
author. If the author's defense was untrue and he had indeed remembered
appellant, this can be used as a factor in considering evidence of the author's ill
will or spite toward appellant. Otherwise, no liability should result. Applying a
negligence standard in the case of the forgotten plaintiff is as equally
unattractive as applying such a standard in the scenario of the coincidental use
of a real name.
2. Roman A Clef
The roman a clef genre presents much closer cases regarding defendant's
liability. The gap between fact and fiction is narrower under the roman a clef
than under the pure fiction cases. The term roman a clef refers to a novel that
"represents historical events and characters under the guise of fiction." 19 9 This
representation of historical events and characters under the umbrella of fiction
presents an inherent difficulty in separating the factual portions of the novel
from the fictional portions. The author of the roman a clef models his
characters after real persons, but protects their identities by giving the
characters fictitious names. 10
The facts of Kelly v. Loew's, Inc."' illustrate the roman a clef genre.
Plaintiff, Robert Kelly, a commander in the United States Navy, brought suit
for defamation based on the "thinly disguised" portrayal of him in the motion
picture They Were Ependable. Plaintiff alltged that defendant's portrayal of
him as "Rusty Ryan" showed him engaging in conduct unbecoming of an
officer and a gentleman. The book, upon which the motion picture was based,
The court's rationale was that no reasonable person could have believed that the article
pointed to plaintiff in light of a clear statement by reporter in boldface print that the names
were fictitious. The court observed that this was a "remarkable set of facts," yet still found
in defendant's favor. Id. at 1272.
108 Geisler, 616 F.2d at 637; see supra Part TI.A.2 on disclaimers.
109 Supra note 12.
110 Supra note 12.
11 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
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purported to be and in fact, was a substantially accurate report of histoncal
events regarding the way news of the Pearl Harbor disaster reached the United
States Naval Base at Cavite in the Philippines. 112 Plaintiff recovered damages
for defamation.11 3
Liability of the author of roman a clef should, as in the case of pure
fiction, be determined using the classical malice fault standard. Unless the
author intended ill will toward the plaintiff, he should not be liable for
defamation. The question of liability is hinged on whether the depiction of the
fictional character is a "failed disguise"" 4 or whether the author's use of the
fictional name is merely a "sham" case." 5 If the author created a fictitious
name to shield the true identity of his or her character and to prevent harm to
plaintiff, then no liability will attach under the classical malice standard. 116 If,
however, the author's intent was to inflict harm on plamtiff and mtentionally
make his true identity known to the reader, the use of a fictitious name will not
shield the author from liability." 7  -
This classical malice approach is particularly suited to the roman a clef
scenario. When the author makes an effort to disguise the real person, this is
evidence that the author did not intend ill will to the mdividual. If a reader
should perceive the character as resembling the real person, the author who has
made a valid effort at disguising the real person should not be held liable." 8
112 Id. at 477.
113 The Kelly court acknowledged that in the broadest way, plaintiff was depicted as a
"gallant officer." ld. at 481. However, within the tradition of the professional class of naval
officers, the depiction makes plaintiff appear as "an undisciplined man" who does not
measure up to the "'regulation' model of a good officer." Id.
114 Critics Franklin and Trager characterize the failed disguise case as that in which
the "author [has] consciously patterned the fictional character on a real person, but intended
to disguise that person so plaintiff would not be able to show with clear and convincing
evidence that reasonable readers understood the fictional character to be him." Franklin &
Trager, supra note 90, at 224-25.
115 Critics Franklin and Trager define the sham case as one in which the "author's real
purpose was to veil an attack on plaintiff." Franklin & Trager, supra note 90, at 223. The
focus is the author's "deliberate [intent] that readers take one of his 'fictional' characters as
the plaintiff." Id.
116 Supra note 114.
117 Supra note 115.
118 Most courts have recognized the right to sue for defamation when the reasonable
reader has perceived the character to resemble a real person. See, e.g., Yousoupoff v.
MGM Pictures, Ltd., [1934150 T.L.R. 581 (Eng. C.A.). In Yousoupoff, the "real" Princess
Natasha successfully sustained a libel action based upon her depiction as either a rape or
seduction victim of the famous Rasputin prior to the Russian Revolution. The court held that
a publisher could be held liable if a reasonable person could interpret the libel as relating to
plaintiff. Id.
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However, protecting the author's interest is contingent on absence of classical
malice. Thus, the failed disguise will be protected while the sham case will not.
This outcome is largely a policy decision. In the failed disguise scenario,
the plaintiff has suffered some reputational harm. Because a reader has
recognized the fictitious character as plaintiff, plaintiff's reputation has been
exposed to the reader's scrutiny. Thus, there is no doubt that reputational harm
has resulted. Nonetheless, when there is a tension between the author's free
speech and the reputational interest of the plaintiff, the author's interest must
prevail. The reader's perceptions must not affect the author's liability. 119
Similarly, disclaimers are evidence of the author's intent to protect plaintiffs
identity.120 Finally, artistic expression must be promoted. 121
3. Faction
Faction 22 draws even more intensely upon reality than the roman a clef
because faction uses real names and the persons they represent to depict
specific conduct. 12 Faction is an amalgamation of fact and fiction, but the
format creates what one critic has called "the verbal equivalent of an optical
illusion" 124 which makes it somewhat apparent to the reader that the work is an
exaggeration based on a real person. Because the author of faction has used the
plaintiff's real name in his or her work, the author cannot assert a disguise
defense as evidence of lack of intent to harm plaintiff. However, the intent of
the author should still be scrutinized under the classical malice standard for
factionalization.
In the faction genre, the of and concerning requirement is not at issue.
Clearly, when an author uses the name of a famous person and creates a story
from actions of that real person, there is no question that the factionalization is
of and concerning the plaintiff. The issue in faction becomes one of protection
of plaintiffs reputation. As mentioned earlier, when a reasonable reader can
connect a fictional character to a real person, some reputational harm must be
acknowledged when a defamatory utterancd exists.125 Nonetheless, the First
Amendment interest of the author must prevail at the expense of some harm to
119 See supra Part I.A.1.
120 See supra Part fII.A.2.
121 See supra Part III.A.3.
122 For a definition of faction, see supra note 11.
123 Silver, supra note 11, at 1080.
124 Silver, supra note 11, at 1083.
125 See supra Part III.A.
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plaintiff's reputation. 126 In the absence of ill will or spite on behalf of the
defendant, the author's creative freedom must be protected.
An example of faction is the novel, The Public Burning, by Robert
Coover.127 In this novel, Coover tells the story through two narrators, one of
whom is identified as Richard Nixon. The novel discusses the trial of Julius
and Ethel Rosenburg and purports to present factual aspects of this event. The
novel also contains portions that are fictionalized, such as Richard Nixon's
involvement in a bungled would-be seduction of Ethel Rosenburg. In addition,
the novel portrays political figures such as Assistant Prosecutor Roy Cohn and
Judge Irving Kaufman. The Public Burning was never the source of a libel
action. However, this genre presents an argument for a defamation cause of
action because Richard Nixon might argue that he suffered reputational harm as
a result of this novel.
Nixon's claim would fail under the classical malice standard of fault. The
author's ability to create must be safeguarded provided that he or she intended
no harm to plaintiff. Under the New York T7nes standard, the plaintiff's interest
might prevail over the writer's interest. Plaintiff might, successfully prove
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard thereof because defendant used the
names of real persons and fictionalized some of the events within the novel.
Such a result would thwart the First Amendment safeguards for freedom of
expression. Although fact and fiction become even less separable in faction
because of the use of real persons and their real names, the classical, malice
standard must still be applied to safeguard the First Amendment rights of the
author and protect the reputational interests of the plaintiff when the author has
acted with ill will.
126 See supra Part I.A.
127 ROBERT COOVER, THE PUBLIC BURNING (1976). This novel is discussed by
Franklin and Trager, supra note 90, at 231, and Silver, supra note 11, at 1067-68. Other
examples of faction include E.L. DocroRow, RAGTIME (1st Ballantine Books ed. 1987)
(1975) and PHImi RoTH, OUR GANG (1971) cited in Silver, supra note 11, at 1068. Street
v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), illustrates the issues arising
from faction. In Street, plaintiff, Victoria Price Street, sued for defamation based on how
the defendant depicted her in a televised historical drama called Judge Horton and the
Scottsboro Boys. The drama was based on historical events and plaintiffs real name was
used. Street was portrayed in a derogatory light as a woman attempting to send nine
innocent black males to the electric chair for a rape they did not commit. The court applied
a constitutional malice standard m this case and found that there was no evidence of malice
in this publication. Id.
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
4. Docudrama
The final genre to consider is that of the docudrama.1 28 Docudramatization
consists of adding fictional dialogue to a biographical treatment of a celebrity's
life story.129 Most of the cases that have arisen as the result of docudramas
involve right of publicity causes of action;' 30 they are not defamation cases.
However, docudrama is an area that could present problems in the defamation
context. The issue that arises in the context of docudramas is the limitation of
the author's right to add fictional dialogue to a real life story While there is
some fidelity to fact, the dialogue used to express the true story is fictionalized.
As a blend of fact and fiction, docudramas present the same problems m the
context of defamation as factionalization or the roman a clef
Docudramas should be protected under the First Amendment through the
classical malice approach. Although the creator is attempting to convey real life
events, he or she is doing so m an artistic medium. A docudrama "partakes of
author's license-it is a creative interpretation of reality."131 In Davis v. Costa-
Gavras,132 the court applied the New York Tnes standard to decide that no
cause of action could be sustained against the creator of a docudrama.133 The
128 Made-for-television movies are the best examples of docudramas. The Any Fisher
Story chromcled the drama of the "Long Island Lolita," her alleged affair with Joey
Buttafioco, and the attempted murder of Mrs. Buttafuoco. Jon Lafayette, Courting Viewers;
TV Playsfor Ratings with High-Profile Trals, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 8, 1993, at 1. The
decade-long battle between Auschwitz survivor, Mel Mermelstem and revisionist historians
who questioned the fate of Jews during World War II was the subject of the made-for-
television docudrama, Never Forget. Mark I. Pinsky, Doubters of the Holocaust Win a
Round in Court, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at B9. The Texas Cheerleader
Murder Plot is the made-for-cable movie about Wanda Holloway's attempted murder of
Verna Heath, the mother of a 13 year-old girl who was perceived by Holloway as her
daughter's cief rival for a high school cheerleading spot. Tom Curtis, 2, 4, 6, 8, Movie
Rights, Negotiate! Cheerleader Case Figures Are Wheeling & Dealing, WASH. POST, Sept.
9, 1991, atBi.
129 Lisa A. Lawrence, Television Docudramas and the Right of Publicity: Too Bad Liz,
That's Show Biz, 8 CoMM./ENT. L.J. 257, 279 (1986). For a more comprehensive
definition of docudrama and its relationship to the documentary, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
130 The right of publicity is the right of a person to "own, protect, and commercially
exploit his own name, likeness, and persona." Deborah Manson, The Televmson Docudrama
and the Right of Publicity, COMM. & LAW, Feb. 1985, at 41, 44.
131 Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
132 654 F. Supp. 653.
133 Id. In Davis, plaintiff brought a defamation suit based on defendant's portrayal of
him m the docudrama, Misung. Plaintiff, the Commander of the United States Military
Group, complained that defendants acted with constitutional malice when they portrayed
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court found that defendant had not acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard thereof. This is a suitable result. However, application of a classical
malice standard would have gone even further to protect the author. The court
noted that dramatic embellishments in the docudrama did not distort the
fundamental story being told.134 So long as the author's embellishments are not
intended to harm plaintiff, the film creator should be insulated from liability.
The Davis court framed the defamation issue in terms of the quantum of
fictionalization. The court stated that "the First Amendment... does not
demand literal truth in every episode depicted." 135 However, the Davs court
did place emphasis on the fact that the author had only indulged m "minor"
fictionalization. 136 This leaves open the possibility that the author could be
subject to liability under the constitutional malice fault standard if he or she
crosses this threshold of minor fictionalization. When has the author strayed far
enough from minor fictionalization to give the plaintiff clear and convincing
evidence of constitutional malice?
Instead, analysis should focus on the intent of the author. If an author
indulges in "major" fictionalization, this is acceptable -under the classical
malice standard of fault so long as there is no ill will on behalf of the author.
The same result is not clear under the Davis approach. Setting boundaries and
parameters around an author's creativity is likely to produce ill effects in light
of the First Amendment rights of the author.
V. CONCLUSION
Defamation in fiction is a unique brand of speech that must be approached
differently than defamation in other contexts, such as political advertisements
or newspaper articles. Because the very nature of fiction involves creating an
imaginary world of falsity, the New York Tes test of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard thereof is an inadequate test when applied to fiction. In
addition, the treatment of fiction as opinion is unsatisfactory because this
approach focuses on the perceptions of a teasonable reader, rather than the
intent of the author. To afford the author greater protection under the First
Amendment, the intent of the author must be examined under the classical
malice fault standard to determine liability for defamation in fiction cases.
him. In the film, the character representing plaintiff ordered or approved a Chilean order to
kill Charles Horman, an American residing m Chile. Id.
1 3 4 d. at 657.
135 Id. at 658.
136 Id. (stating that, [iun docudrama, runor fictionalization cannot be considered
evidence or support for the requirement of actual malice") (emphasis added).
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Indeed, a modicum of reputational harm may result when a plaintiff is
portrayed m a fictional medium. Nonetheless, policy must prefer a protection
of the author's freedom of speech at the expense of some reputational harm to
the plaintiff when these competing interests collide. Unless an author acted with
spite or ill will, his or her interests must be safeguarded, although such
protection may result in some reputational harm to the plaintiff.
